This is the second in a three part “In-Depth” post reflecting on the relationship between Jews and Poles in the relatively recent past, as I have observed this relationship over the last forty years. In the first part, I reflected upon the circumstances that led me to engage in Polish cultural and political life and upon my initial experiences during my research there in the 1970s. In this post, I address the conflicting collective memories of Poles and Jews, particularly as they worked to remember together in a ceremony marking the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz in August 1995.

I observed the event from a distance in New York, reading newspaper accounts from The New York Times and other foreign sources (from which the non-digitized quotes in the account are drawn). Viewing the event from the outside emphasized my ambiguous connection with the memory conflicts. As an American Jew, with many relatives who viewed this with little or no knowledge about the Communist experience, I understand their dismay about apparently insensitive things said and done by the Polish authorities. But as a scholar engaged in Polish affairs for much of my adult life, I realize how difficult it is to respectfully remember the Shoah when its existence was systematically underplayed, distorted and even silenced by the Communist authorities, and, in addition, when much of the Western world hasn’t recognized the degree of Polish suffering at the hands of the Nazis. I noted that even people of good will under these circumstances have great difficulty getting beyond their own limitations and reinforce misunderstandings and worse.

In my next “Why Poland?” post, I will explore what happened when all of this exploded out in the open, in controversies over Jan Gross’s book, Neighbors. It is a difficult book with a very difficult central finding, the Polish Catholics in a small Polish town, Jedwabne, killed their Jewish neighbors in mass, on their own, without Nazi direction. The publication of the book and its reception shows how the wounds of twentieth century atrocities are still quite raw, and how symbolic complicity in the horrors continues, as does resistance.

Today’s post, I think, shows how difficult collective memory can be. I think I reveal that there is an etiquette of remembering. Who remembers and how is as important as what is remembered.  This etiquette made it difficult to write and publish my account and makes deliberate consideration of the problems involved challenging. Slowly over a long period of time, discussion becomes possible. I wonder whether there is enough time, something I will explore.

To read the full In-Depth Analysis “Why Poland? Part 2: Commemorating Auschwitz,” click here.

Poles, that is, Polish Catho­lics, see things differ­ent­ly.  Nearly twenty percent of the Polish population died during the war.  Seventy five thou­sand Polish (Catholic) lives were lost in Auschwitz; a high per­cent­age of the survi­ving inmates of the camp were Polish.  The memory of Polish losses is one of close experi­ence.  From the Polish point of view, the inter­na­tion­al commun­ity has failed to recog­nize the depth and exten­sive­ness of Polish suffer­ing.  For Jews and for many others in the West, the immensity of the Nazi crimes has been summarized by the figure six million, six million Jews from throughout Europe consumed by the Nazi death machine. In Poland, the number has been remembered in a different way: six million Poles killed during the war (half of whom were Jewish, but this conventionally is not noted).

It was with this background that the fiftieth anniver­sary of the liberation was marked.  Many Jewish organi­zations and individuals found the Polish plans for the ceremony wanting, and many Poles viewed their objections with suspicion. The World Jewish Con­gress threat­ened to boycott the commemoration entirely.  In its judgment, the Polish authorities were trying to trans­form the ceremo­nies into a Polish event.  At times, the rhetorical con­flict over the planning of the event became very tough.  Michel Fried­man, a leading Jewish spokes­man and member of the German Chris­tian Democratic Party, complained that equal represen­tation of Polish Christian and Jewish victims presented a gross misrepre­senta­tion of history.  He declared: “If I recall the history precise­ly, I have to say that the murderers there were mostly of the Christian religion.”  Friedman, whose parents were saved by Oskar Schindler, believed that the Polish Catholic Church is still anti-Semitic.  He went on to point out: “The people in charge must realize that the world is watch­ing to see that the message of this memorial day is histori­cally cor­rect.”

But historical correctness is very much in the eyes of the beholder.  According to some reports, Polish Cathol­ics were criti­cal of the rest of the world for its tendency to “Juda­ize” Ausch­witz. The equa­tion of the Polish nation with that of the German nation was simply not acceptable in Poland, too many Poles suffered too much under German occupa­tion.  Thus, the Polish Catho­lic Bishops refused to join their German col­leagues in a joint proclamation concern­ing Catholic responsi­bility for the Holocaust because it “could be per­ceived as a joint admis­sion of guilt for the Holo­caust.” In this refusal, they raised questions about their resoluteness against antisemitism.  They choose not to be associated with “the most radical self-criticism from an institu­tion of the church,” as the Italian newspaper Il Messagero put it. But from the Polish Bishops point of view, it was perfectly clear that an equation of German and Polish responsibility is absolutely unacceptable.  This confrontation is especially poignant after the Jedwabne revelations, which I will examine in my next and last “Why Poland?” post.

In the end, a sort of symbolically acceptable resolution of the controversy was attained, despite mutual recriminations and suspi­cions.  Even the inelegance of the commemorations and the events leading up to them seemed fitting.  The two parties, the Poles and the Jews, with the world press observing, tried to accommodate each other, while they remained true to their memo­ries.  They each knew that the enormity of the event being commemorated demanded that the memory disputes had to be re­solved.  They accomplished this by holding three distinct ceremo­nial events: one on Thursday January 26, 1995, in Krakow at Ja­giellonian University, the second, an improvised special Jewish ceremony at the Birk­enau death camp, on the 26th, during a break in the official ceremonies, and the third, the main official ceremony on the 27th.

In the ceremony at Jagiellonian, where one hundred eighty three Professors were once rounded up and deported, Lech Walesa emphasized the enormity of Polish suffering.  He remem­bered that the Nazis set out to destroy Poland’s “intellectual and spiritual strength,” but he did not mention at all Jewish suffering.  A distinctly Polish form of remembrance dominated.

The separate Jewish religious ceremony was organized by the European Jewish Congress.  No Polish officials attended.  The only government figure there was the German President, Roman Herzog.  The Kaddish, the Jewish prayer for the dead, was recited.  The members of the media outnumbered the participants, since the Polish government made no special effort to inform survivors about the ceremonies.  To underscore Jewish suffering, Wiesel opened his remarks in Yiddish; the speaker of the Israeli Parliament, Shevah Weiss, spoke in Hebrew, and the President of the European Jewish Committee, Jean Kahn denounced in English, the “nationalistic” ceremony organized by the Polish government.

Yet, by the next day it was evident that the Jewish protests concerning the Polish plans for the commemoration did result in changes in the ceremonies.  President Walesa did note in his opening remarks on Friday the special suffering of Jews and Gypsies, and Poles: Ausch­witz “stands for the suffering of many nations, especially the Jewish nation.” “Whole nations, the Jews and the Gypsies, were sup­posed to be exterminated here together with others – above all, us Poles.”  Elie Wiesel clarified Walesa’s statement: “It is true that not all victims were Jews.  But all Jews were victims.” One Polish survivor observed, as if answering Wiesel: “Most people who died were Jews.  But most people who lived in the barracks [as camp inmates] were Poles.” Walesa was criticized for not specifically mentioning Jewish suffering in his Thursday address, but in two separate addresses on Friday, he included such specific references.

Each side was true to its memories, but in the end accommo­dated to the memories of the other.  The problems between Jews and Poles were not overcome, but those problems were put aside as best as they could be without compromising the integrity of the competing memory sets of each group.

I observed these ceremonies with ambivalence.  On the one hand, I felt relieved that problems that bothered me on my initial stay in Poland, when I visited the Auschwitz Museum and Jews were not recognized as victims, were finally out in the open.  On the other hand, I believed that fundamental misunderstandings were being perpetuated, and knew that addressing these would not be easy.

Democratic Poland has an obligation: to confront the past in a way that is qualitatively different from communist accounts of history.  On the face of it, the obligation is rela­tively simple.  While the Communists told lies and dis­pensed propa­ganda, democrats should truthfully consider histo­ry.  Yet, the realiza­tion of this obligation is no easy matter.  Collective memory after the totalitarian experience is a troubled and troubling enterprise. Like the envi­ron­men­tal pollu­tion left behind from the great socialist industrial dinosaurs, the totali­tarian control of cultural life has had lasting effects that are not easily remedied.  This is an overlooked obstacle in remembering Ausch­witz, not appreciated by outside observers, as well as actors on the inside.

Until 1989, the remembrance of things Jewish in Poland was framed by official public institutions of the Party-state, by the Catholic Church and its lay institutions, and by the movements and institutions of the opposition.  As was the general rule, the Party-state domi­nat­ed and the society responded.  Jewish issues were not, of course, a pressing or a major problem.  But they did have a way of coming up at the center of major political confrontations, often without Jews being much in­volved.  The Jews who were very visible in the first communist governments, perhaps at the instigation of Stalin, became for the Polish anti-Semites the symbols of Stalinism.  This identification was used by the nationalist Party faction.  But once this faction employed the old xenophobic formula to attempt to gain power in a wave of repression in 1968, opposition to antisemitism took on a new importance.  It was not only a way to assert good liberal creden­tials, indicating commitment to modern western values.  It was a way to fight against the Party.  This worked until the Party itself, after martial law, started to use a respectful memory of the Jewish presence in Poland’s past to gain legitimacy in western eyes.  Then for the first time since the immedi­ate post-war period, Polish-Jewish relations were opened to critical public examination.  Although this examination was still dis­torted by censorship and the limitations of Communist control of most forms of public communi­cation and debate, it marked a change in the form and content of collective memory.  Things could be discussed openly that could not be discussed previously and the way they could be discussed was fundamentally changed.  Such changes, of course, escalated after the fall of communism.

The public discussion had then, and until quite recently continued to have, an odd abstract quality.  It was as much shaped by post-war Polish politics, i.e., in the absence of Jews and after the Holocaust, as it was shaped by evidence of Polish – Jewish interactions before and during the war.  The great theorist of collective memory, Maurice Halbwachs would have understood, as would have Pierre Nora. The questions raised were broad and theoretical, and were more shaped by myths than by historical investigations.  They were instigat­ed by the passing of commemorative dates, such as the commemora­tion of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, or inter­na­tion­al cultural events, such as the release of the Claude Lanzman’s film, Shoah, than by a system­at­ic con­fron­ta­tion with the trou­bled rela­tions between two peoples.  Were the Poles victims like the Jews or victim­iz­ers of the Jews?  Should the Poles apologize for their behavior during the war, as many stood by with approval or mute accep­tance as the Holocaust was perpetrated in their backyards, or even took part in genocidal actions?  While a few courageous Poles frankly explored the degree of Polish responsi­bility, loud outcries of protest denounced such explora­tions as betrayals of the national honor.  Journals in which such discus­sion was opened were besieged with anti-Semitic condemna­tions from their readers.  Memories and beliefs privatized for a half century were given public expression.  Public memory was opened; the time of an easy collective memory was over, thus the controversies over commemoration of Auschwitz.  And something even more difficult was yet to be confronted: a troubled history with significant dark unacknowledged corners.  While collective memory may serve the interests of the present, as Halbwach’s theorized, there is a way that historical investigation, and concrete evidence from the past, such as the evidence brought forward by Jan Gross, in his book Neighbors, can challenge and change those very interests. In an upcoming post I will report on these controversies and reflect on their meanings, and also try to explain what I see in the much of Central Europe, premature Holocaust fatigue.

Memories are not simply about the past. They define the present and shape the future: collective memory making, as Maurice Halbwachs’ influential work demonstrates, personal memories, and iterative interchanges between and among personal, interpersonal, and collected memories. I have been thinking about this on the occasion of the anniversary of a parade in Chicago.

I recently received from someone on a Vietnam War listserv comments and links to Chicago Tribune articles discussing the “Chicago 25^th Anniversary Welcome Home Parade” for Vietnam War veterans. Held originally on June 13^th, 1986 over a decade after the last Americans had left South Vietnam, the Chicago Welcome Home Parade provided for Vietnam Vets the recognition they felt they were denied upon their return from an unpopular war. The 25^th anniversary of the parade was held last weekend, on June 17, 18 and 19, as its original participants are fading away, many no longer able to march.

It is estimated that about 200,000 veterans marched and another 300,000 spectators cheered them on in 1986, a surprisingly large number. In 1985, New York City had a ticker-tape parade in which about 25,000 Vietnam veterans participated. Prior to 1982, when the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was dedicated, Vietnam Veterans received very little recognition and many rarely talked about the war. The memorials and parades changed attitudes towards Vietnam Veterans and how they felt about themselves.

The Chicago Tribune’s multimedia links capture objectified personal and collected memories, providing insights into interpersonal and collective memories. This year’s anniversary celebration afforded numerous associational opportunities for the participants including a banquet, the display of the Moving Wall, a half-sized replica of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, a ceremony which honored soldiers who have returned from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and an interfaith service held at Chicago’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The organizers believe that no soldier should have to wait a decade or more for a homecoming welcome. Memories of the past and associational activities are reshaping the present and future treatment of veterans.

As Halbwachs suggests, the associational aspects are diminishing as organizers and participants have continued to be lost to age-related issues, illnesses and death. One organizer died of pancreatic cancer last year and another continues the effort despite a continuing fight with hepatitis C, which he contracted during transfusions associated with a limb lost during the war.

Some of the remembrances, real and imagined, raise sensitive issues and are part of a battle for Vietnam War meanings and memories. For instance, Jack Shiffler, chairman of the Welcome Home 2011 anniversary event, shared his recollection of his homecoming in December 1967. He contends that although military officials cautioned returning Vietnam Veterans against wearing their uniforms while traveling because of war protests, he chose to wear his. He reports that as he was walking through an airline terminal in Los Angeles, he was approached by an attractive young woman dressed in the attire of someone belonging to a Hari Krishna group. She asked if he was a Marine back from Vietnam. He acknowledged that he was, and then Shiffler says that she spit in his face and verbally abused him. He didn’t talk about the war for years. Shiffler contrasts this with the love and affection that he was given during the 1986 celebration,remembering seeing a sign, “Honor the warrior, not the war.”

Spitting in the face is part of contested Vietnam War remembrances. Although it is recalled in many narratives of the war, it is contested by sociologist Jerry Lembcke in his book The Spitting Image, Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam. Lembcke contends that the spitting in the face narrative is a myth, and sees it as his role to help write an alternative history, constructed from other memories to help establish other identities. His work is highly controversial among Vietnam War Veterans.

Few people wanted to talk to me about the war upon my return from Vietnam. I was welcomed home by family and a small group of friends. The 25^th anniversary celebration links helped me recall them. I also recall being virtually shunned by two editors who took my place on my college newspaper when I visited them. On the other hand, I probably was given my first job out of the Army by a company which was very supportive of veterans. My recollections are part of the memory making process.

One of the 1986 articles on the Chicago Tribune website was by Anne Keegan, a very influential journalist in Chicago. On a visit to Vietnam, years after the first Chicago parade, Keegan brought home four Vietnam War Zippo lighters. She was able to return one to its owner. Keegan shared in the Captain’s memories, and they influenced her and her readers. In one of her stories, Keegan noted “The three things a soldier treasured besides mail were the picture of his girl, his toothbrush and his Zippo lighter because the rest belonged to Uncle Sam.” Keegan passed away in May 2011. She helped break the gender glass ceiling in reporting and went to places and reported on stories traditionally off-limits to women journalists. I became aware of Keegan through my dissertation research on the Vietnam War Zippo lighter and meaning and memory making.

While, the 25^th anniversary celebration may be a small thing, going unnoticed by the media generally, it illuminates how we actively connect the past, present and future.