Art, Culture and Memory: Conversations with Vera Zolberg (Introduction)

Vera Zolberg © Claudio Benzecry

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A couple weeks ago, I gave the keynote address at a conference honoring my dear friend and colleague, Vera Zolberg. The papers presented to this conference, “From the Art of Memory to Memory and Art,” were in her special fields of inquiry, the sociology of culture, the arts and the study of collective memory. It was a wonderful event, a long set of conversations with Vera and her work. The day’s proceedings revealed how her fields of inquiry have advanced in the past twenty years, how she has contributed to this advance, and how the fields can and do speak to general public concerns. I am hoping that we will be able to put them together in a special collection drawn from the conference. Here I present my contribution to give a sense of what we discussed and its significance. I started with one of my pet peeves, concerning the word “reflection.”

To continue reading the full In-Depth post “Art, Culture and Memory: Conversations with Vera Zolberg,” click here.

Art, Culture and Memory: Conversations with Vera Zolberg

When I hear the word “reflection,” applied to the study of culture, I reach for my red pencil, if not my gun. My problem with the word is that it stops inquiry just when it should begin. While it may be generally true that the ruling ideas of the times are the ideas of the ruling class, I think our job as sociologists and students of culture is to actually explain how this happens, what are the specifics, and the exceptions, avoiding reductionism, understanding both the significance of cultural creativity and accomplishment, and the complexity of the social world.

I am thinking of this pet peeve of mine today for two reasons: because I think that the work of Vera Zolberg stands as a model of what can be learned when we move beyond sociological truism in thinking about the sociology of the arts and memory, and culture broadly understood, and also because I am, ironically, tempted in opening my presentation today with a “reflection note.” As in: the intellectual quality of Zolberg, as a sociologist of the arts, collective memory and culture, is a reflection of the quality of Vera, as a person. And, ironically, I am not sure I can, or should even try, to explain this connection between professional accomplishment and personal quality, but I know I should talk about both the quality of Zolberg’s work and about Vera as a person (our people would say a mensch) today.

Vera and I have been closely connected professionally for a long time, from the beginning of my career as a serious student of sociology. We both worked to specialize in the sociology of the arts at the University of Chicago. When I was preparing my special field exam in this area, I discovered that there were three students who focused in their studies on the arts before me, Mason Griff (who I had studied with as an undergraduate), Hugh Dalziel Duncan and Zolberg. This was when I first read Vera’s work, her dissertation on the Art Institute of Chicago (a work that I still refer to, as the students in this semester’s departmental dissertation seminar can confirm).

Vera and I studied with the same teachers, Morris Janowitz, Donald . . .

Read more: Art, Culture and Memory: Conversations with Vera Zolberg

Election in France: A European Roosevelt?

Francois Hollande, Jan.19, 2012 © Jean-Marc Ayrault | Wikimedia Commons

I write here about the election in France, but first must note that the most important European news this week very well may come from Greece. The legislative elections there clearly show the disastrous political consequences of hyper-austerity. They demonstrate that the European handling of the crisis has not only brought no remedy. It has aggravated the problem. The results of the Greek elections provide the context for understanding politics in Europe, including France.

In France, François Hollande’s victory did not come as a surprise, but the nature of the victory indicates fundamental changes in the political landscape. The unexpected element was the relatively low margin of victory. He received only 51.6% of the votes after having led constantly in the polls, approaching 60% at times. Sarkozy’s far-right accented campaign shocked the so-called “Republican right,” leading the center right leader François Bayrou to vote for Holland in the second round of the election. It did, though significantly, enable Sarkozy to win substantial support from those who voted for the far-rightist Marine Le Pen in the first round. This needs deliberate consideration.

Sarkozy’s hyper-nationalist, openly anti-European and strongly anti-Islam stance during the last days of the campaign ominously has reunited the right on an ideological basis. Of course, Sarkozy’s neo-nationalist turn was partly tactical, but now there is a real possibility of a dialogue between the far-rightist National Front and the “Republican” right (the President’s party UMP). The so-called “droite populaire,” a part of the UMP that claims 70 députés in the Assemblée nationale, is not against talking to Le Pen. The new ideological horizon for the French right is undoubtedly one of the most important consequences of the presidential election. Sarkozy has played the nationalist and anti-Islam card with an unexpected dedication, particularly if one recalls his attitude during the first years of his presidency, when he practiced the “ouverture” to the left and to ethnic minorities, appointing the French-Senegalese Rama Yade and the French-North Africans, . . .

Read more: Election in France: A European Roosevelt?

Media Conspiracy? May Day, The New York Times and Fox

Transit workers demonstrating on May Day, NYC, 2012 © The Eyes of New York | Flickr

Last week, while observing the nationwide strike on May Day, and also the performance of a sociology student from The New School on Fox News a couple of days later, I wondered about the possibilities and obstacles of reinventing political culture. I was impressed that there was a significant attempt to bring May Day home, and also impressed by powerful media resistance to significant change in our political life.

May Day is celebrated around the world as Labor Day, everywhere, that is, except where it all began, the United States. The holiday commemorates the 1886 Haymarket Affair in Chicago and the struggle for decent working conditions and the eight-hour workday. It is an official holiday in over eighty countries, recognized in even more. Yet, until this year, it has been all but ignored in the U.S., except by those far to the left of the political mainstream. Thus, the calls by people associated with Occupy Wall Street for a nationwide general strike was notable, and it was quite striking that there were nationwide demonstrations including many in New York, capped by a large a mass demonstration at Union Square Park, right near my office. Not only leftists were there. Mainstream labor unions were as well. In many ways, I found the gathering to be as impressive as the ones I saw in Zuccotti Park last fall. Yet, it did not attract serious mass media attention.

The New York Times was typical. It had a careful article on May Day in Moscow, but reported the American actions as a local story, focused on minor violence, arrests and traffic disruptions.

The events’ significance did not reach beyond those who immediately were involved or who were already committed to its purpose through social media. Where OWS broke through to a broad public in its initial demonstrations downtown in the Fall, it failed to do so on May Day in demonstrations that were both large and inventive. Beyond the violence of the fringe of those involved in the movement and the provocative . . .

Read more: Media Conspiracy? May Day, The New York Times and Fox

7 Ways Argentina Defies the Conventional Economic Wisdom

Argentina's Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default  (book cover) © Routledge 2011

Reflections on Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery, by Michael Cohen

My New School colleague Michael Cohen’s new book Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default provides the first detailed account in English of one of the remarkable episodes in recent economic history. Cohen’s rendering of 21st century Argentine political economy is detailed, nuanced, filled with summaries of political debates and standoffs and with a rich appreciation of the unequal ways in which the economic benefits are shared as the Argentine economy recovered from its macroeconomic collapse in 2001.

The book is a fast-paced (at times blow-by-blow) account, of macroeconomic extremes in terms of debt, exchange rates, government budget and trade balances and fiscal and monetary policy in Argentina. But when I finished reading the book (and took a big exhale) what struck me — not an expert on Argentina by any stretch — were the many ways that the Argentine experience contradicts the conventional economic wisdom. Without much explicit attention to issue of conventional economic wisdom (other than the attack on World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policies imposed on Argentina in the 1990s), Cohen’s account nonetheless forces us to think critically about some widely-held views in economics and especially development economics. Let me describe seven different ways in which Argentina’s experience in the 21st century should make us revisit some of the accepted aspects of economic wisdom.

To continue reading Will Milberg’s review of Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery by Michael Cohen, click here.

7 Ways Argentina Defies the Conventional Economic Wisdom

Argentina's Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default  (book cover) © Routledge 2011

Reflections on Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery, by Michael Cohen

My New School colleague Michael Cohen’s new book Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default provides the first detailed account in English of one of the remarkable episodes in recent economic history. Cohen’s rendering of 21st century Argentine political economy is detailed, nuanced, filled with summaries of political debates and standoffs and with a rich appreciation of the unequal ways in which the economic benefits are shared as the Argentine economy recovered from its macroeconomic collapse in 2001.

The book is a fast-paced (at times blow-by-blow) account, of macroeconomic extremes in terms of debt, exchange rates, government budget and trade balances and fiscal and monetary policy in Argentina. But when I finished reading the book (and took a big exhale) what struck me — not an expert on Argentina by any stretch — were the many ways that the Argentine experience contradicts the conventional economic wisdom. Without much explicit attention to issue of conventional economic wisdom (other than the attack on World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policies imposed on Argentina in the 19990s), Cohen’s account nonetheless forces us to think critically about some widely-held views in economics and especially development economics. Let me describe seven different ways in which Argentina’s experience in the 21st century should make us revisit some of the accepted aspects of economic wisdom.

Conventional wisdom #1. Conventional wisdom is that default on foreign debt will have disastrous consequences for economic growth, economic suicide. The country that defaults, the thinking goes, immediately shuts itself out of international capital markets for an unpredictably long period of time, brings on a long-term collapse of the exchange rate, requires a long-term recession as the country is forced to “live within its means.”

Argentina defaulted in early 2002 and then:

*one year later was borrowing considerable from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.

*between 2002 and 2006 inward FDI rose at a rate of 26% per year (much from Brazil)

*by . . .

Read more: 7 Ways Argentina Defies the Conventional Economic Wisdom

It’s the Economy, Stupid: But Why So Stupid?

Ostrich at the Louisville Zoo © Ltshears | Wikimedia Commons

Arrowsmith was an economics professor at the City College of New York. After he left that position, he worked for many years as a business economist for a multinational oil company, where, like most corporate economists, he used a macroeconomic framework essentially based on Keynes. -Jeff

Whatever can explain the rise of mass hysteria over the U.S. national debt and federal deficits? To be sure, debt/deficit issues give the Administration’s political opponents a grand weapon in the gladiatorial contest that constitutes the nation’s public politics, but the issue only works because of a virulent public antipathy to serious macroeconomic analysis that has developed over the past four decades. In 1971, President Nixon announced “now I am a Keynesian,” but by 2011, President Obama (in his State of the Union address) said “Every day, families have to live within their means. They deserve a government that will do the same.”

In this environment, as the U.S. continues to suffer from massive unemployment of labor and underutilization of physical and intellectual capital, political survival almost requires economic policy-makers to pay obeisance to the most primitive anti-Keynesian economic theology.

The proverbial Martian certainly would not anticipate such widespread disdain for serious macroeconomics from the overall educational endowment of the American population. By historical standards, the U.S. population is highly educated, with over 40 percent of the labor force having completed tertiary education as of the end of the last decade and annual four-year college graduations reaching 1.6 million. While only about 3-5 percent of U.S. undergraduates major in economics, a far larger proportion experience some exposure to economics. Although data are far from perfect, the best estimates suggest that half undergo a one-semester introductory course and as many as one third of the total cohort take a two-semester sequence. At first blush, even with the most cynical view of the seriousness of students or their instructors, this suggests that a substantial part of the electorate might be expected to have assimilated central theoretical concepts such as the intrinsic difference between the national economy and the individual household and the potential use . . .

Read more: It’s the Economy, Stupid: But Why So Stupid?