7 Ways Argentina Defies the Conventional Economic Wisdom

Argentina's Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default  (book cover) © Routledge 2011

Reflections on Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery, by Michael Cohen

My New School colleague Michael Cohen’s new book Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default provides the first detailed account in English of one of the remarkable episodes in recent economic history. Cohen’s rendering of 21st century Argentine political economy is detailed, nuanced, filled with summaries of political debates and standoffs and with a rich appreciation of the unequal ways in which the economic benefits are shared as the Argentine economy recovered from its macroeconomic collapse in 2001.

The book is a fast-paced (at times blow-by-blow) account, of macroeconomic extremes in terms of debt, exchange rates, government budget and trade balances and fiscal and monetary policy in Argentina. But when I finished reading the book (and took a big exhale) what struck me — not an expert on Argentina by any stretch — were the many ways that the Argentine experience contradicts the conventional economic wisdom. Without much explicit attention to issue of conventional economic wisdom (other than the attack on World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policies imposed on Argentina in the 1990s), Cohen’s account nonetheless forces us to think critically about some widely-held views in economics and especially development economics. Let me describe seven different ways in which Argentina’s experience in the 21st century should make us revisit some of the accepted aspects of economic wisdom.

To continue reading Will Milberg’s review of Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery by Michael Cohen, click here.

7 Ways Argentina Defies the Conventional Economic Wisdom

Argentina's Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default  (book cover) © Routledge 2011

Reflections on Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery, by Michael Cohen

My New School colleague Michael Cohen’s new book Argentina’s Economic Growth and Recovery: The Economy in a Time of Default provides the first detailed account in English of one of the remarkable episodes in recent economic history. Cohen’s rendering of 21st century Argentine political economy is detailed, nuanced, filled with summaries of political debates and standoffs and with a rich appreciation of the unequal ways in which the economic benefits are shared as the Argentine economy recovered from its macroeconomic collapse in 2001.

The book is a fast-paced (at times blow-by-blow) account, of macroeconomic extremes in terms of debt, exchange rates, government budget and trade balances and fiscal and monetary policy in Argentina. But when I finished reading the book (and took a big exhale) what struck me — not an expert on Argentina by any stretch — were the many ways that the Argentine experience contradicts the conventional economic wisdom. Without much explicit attention to issue of conventional economic wisdom (other than the attack on World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policies imposed on Argentina in the 19990s), Cohen’s account nonetheless forces us to think critically about some widely-held views in economics and especially development economics. Let me describe seven different ways in which Argentina’s experience in the 21st century should make us revisit some of the accepted aspects of economic wisdom.

Conventional wisdom #1. Conventional wisdom is that default on foreign debt will have disastrous consequences for economic growth, economic suicide. The country that defaults, the thinking goes, immediately shuts itself out of international capital markets for an unpredictably long period of time, brings on a long-term collapse of the exchange rate, requires a long-term recession as the country is forced to “live within its means.”

Argentina defaulted in early 2002 and then:

*one year later was borrowing considerable from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.

*between 2002 and 2006 inward FDI rose at a rate of 26% per year (much from Brazil)

*by . . .

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Uruguay at the Crossroads: No Justice without Development

President Jose Mujica and Vice-President Danilo Astori © 2010 Andrea Mazza | Wikimedia Commons

In this post, Antonio Álvarez considers an enduring problem, the relationship between social justice and development in a country moving from dictatorship to democracy. This problem was pressing during the transitions in Latin America and the former Soviet bloc. It endures, as is evident here. The circumstances are always very specific, but the difficulties repeat themselves as is now dramatically evident in North Africa and the Middle East. A creative approach to the difficulties is considered here. -Jeff

Memory and development often seem to be in tension in Latin America. The left speaks of the need to remember the past, particularly the human rights abuses committed by dictatorships during the cold war; the right, on the other hand, is concerned that an obsession with memory will forestall economic growth. A few weeks ago, Gerardo Bleier published, via Facebook, a piece that made the old-guard of the Uruguayan left quite uncomfortable. In the post, he presented a strong and provocative argument concerning collective memory and economic development. A leftist in distinguished standing, Bleier argues that in order to achieve justice concerning human rights violations during the recent Uruguayan dictatorship, Uruguayans must focus on social and economic development. Development, he argues, ought to be seen as an instrument of justice. He has thus rejected the common sense positions of the left and the right and maps out a significant alternative.

Bleier has been a noted Uruguayan journalist since the 1980s. During the first government of the Frente Amplio (Broad Front, the left of center coalition), led by socialist Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010), Bleier served as a high level consultant; and currently, he publishes weekly reflections about the vicissitudes encountered by the present Frente Amplio.

Importantly, he is the son of Eduardo Bleier, who was a high ranking cadre in the Communist Party. Without ever having held a gun, Eduardo was one of the many activists who disappeared, was tortured, and murdered during Uruguay’s “dirty war” of the 1960s and 1970s. He probably died the first week of July, 1976, though no one knows for sure. After being tortured in the most . . .

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